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LEAD ARTICLE

Setting the Stage for Brown: The
Development and Implementation
of the NAACP's School
Desegregation Campaign, 19301950
by Leland B. Ware*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The protest against segregation began early in the twentieth century,
not long after the Supreme Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.'
The fight was led by the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored Persons ("NAACP"), which was founded in 1909 by a group of
black activists and white progressives.
After years of lobbying,

* Louis L Redding Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Delaware. Fisk
University (B.A., 1970); Boston College Law School (J.D., 1973).
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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organizing local chapters, and engaging in other activities, the NAACP
shifted its direction. In the early 1930s, the organization embarked on
a long-range, carefully coordinated litigation campaign that challenged
the laws that enforced segregation. During the years that followed, a
legal revolution was set into motion that altered the foundations of
American jurisprudence. The NAACP's litigation campaign is not as
well remembered as the grassroots demonstrations of the 1960s, but the
culminating event of that phase of the Civil Rights movement, Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka,2 is celebrated as the most significant
Supreme Court decision of modern legal history. The decision in Brown
was the first of a series of decisions that struck down Jim Crow laws and
paved the way for the federal Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s.
Much of the existing literature leaves the impression that the
transition from Plessy to Brown emanated from an enlightened judiciary.
Contrary to these suggestions, the judges who occupied federal courts in
the 1930s and 1940s were conservatives who would have preferred to
avoid confrontations with the complex social, political, and legal issues
that segregation raised. In reality, the NAACP's litigation strategy
compelled a reluctant judiciary to address the many contradictions that
segregation posed. The actual visionary in this process was Charles
Houston, an African-American Civil Rights lawyer, who was the
architect of the NAACP's legal strategy. Houston foresaw a means of
eliminating formal segregation at a time when most Americans accepted
it as a permanent way of life. It was Houston's insight, together with
his ability to orchestrate a coordinated campaign over a several-year
period, that resulted in the elimination of segregation laws.
The significance of the decision in Brown is well-documented, but it
cannot be fully appreciated without an examination of the cases that led
to it. This Article explores the evolution of the legal strategy that was
used in the graduate and professional school cases that set the stage for
Brown. Part II examines Charles Houston's tenure at Howard Law
School. During those years Houston transformed that institution from
a marginal night school to a fully accredited, first-rate institution.
Under Houston's leadership, students at Howard were trained to
structure the test cases that challenged the laws that provided the basis
for segregation. Part III examines the significance of the Margold
Report, a study that was commissioned by the NAACP's Board of
Directors in the early 1930s. The report contained a detailed examination of the "separate but equal doctrine" of Plessy v. Ferguson and
suggested ways in which the policy might be challenged in the courts.

2.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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After Houston was selected to head the NAACP's litigation campaign
in 1935, he modified the Margold Report's recommendations and
developed what became the "equalization strategy." This approach
involved filing cases in Southern states, demanding that the educational
resources made available for African-American students be upgraded to
make them equal to those provided for whites. Carefully remaining
within the confines of Plessy, the "equalization" cases were premised on
the theory that the states that practiced segregation could not afford the
expense of maintaining separate educational systems that were actually
equal. As Part IV of this Article explains, these early cases focused on
graduate and professional schools, the area in which the Southern states
were most vulnerable. In a series of cases in Maryland, Missouri, Texas,
and Oklahoma, the NAACP's lawyers were able to chip away the
foundation of segregation. By the early 1950s the Plessy rationale had
been completely undermined. This Article demonstrates that, without
these efforts, the decision in Brown would not have been possible.
II.

CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON: THE ARCHITECT OF THE LEGAL
STRATEGY

A.

Background
Beginning in the early 1930s, Howard University Law School served
as the West Point for a generation of Civil Rights lawyers. During this
period, the institution was transformed from an unaccredited evening
program to a laboratory for Civil Rights litigation. Howard's evolution
occurred largely through the efforts of Charles Houston, who also
developed the legal strategy that was used to eliminate segregation.
Houston was born in Washington, D.C. on September 3, 1895. His
father, William Houston, was a lawyer who obtained his degree while
working 3for the federal government and attending Howard University
at night.
Charles Houston attended the Garrison Elementary School and M
Street High School in Washington, D.C. Houston's academic record at
M Street provided the foundation for admission to Amherst College in
Massachusetts, where he enrolled in 1911. At Amherst Houston excelled
in his studies, and he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa during his senior
year. After graduating in 1915, Houston returned to Washington, D.C.,
but he did not have any specific plans for a career.4

3.

GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROuNDwORK:

STRUGGLE FOR CWIL RIGHTS 21, 24 (1983).

4. Id. at 26-31.
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After America's entry into World War I, Houston decided to enter the
military. He obtained a position in the black officers' training corps at
Des Moines, Iowa.5 In October 1917, Houston was among the 440
African-Americans who received commissions as officers in the United
States Army. During World War I, black soldiers were the victims of
racism. In a 1940 article, Houston recalled a particularly dangerous
encounter that occurred when he and a companion stumbled on a
confrontation between a black serviceman and a group of white soldiers.
One of the white soldiers became angry after he learned that some
female companions had abandoned him for a black soldier. Houston and
his friend found themselves surrounded by an angry mob. The tense
episode ended after a military police officer intervened. Houston never
forgot the incident. Years later he recalled: "'I made up my mind that
I would never get caught again without knowing something about my
rights; that if luck was with me, and I got through this war, I would
study law and use my time fighting for men who could not strike
back."' 6 After his tour of duty, Houston returned to Washington.7
On September 18, 1919, Houston enrolled in Harvard Law School.
During his first year, Houston was selected to serve on the staff of the
Harvard Law Review, an honor accorded to students who receive the
highest grades.' Houston's academic record during his second year and
his performance on the law review resulted in his election to the law
review's Editorial Board. He was the first African-American to serve in
this capacity.9 In 1922 he graduated cum laude, finishing in the top
five percent of his class. In the following fall, Houston became a
candidate for the advanced degree of Doctor of Juridical Science
("S.J.D."). He was awarded the degree in 1923. After receiving the
S.J.D. degree, he received a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship, which he
used to study law at the University of Madrid during 1923 and 1924.0
B.

Howard University: A Laboratory for Civil Rights Litigation
In 1924 Houston returned to Washington, D.C. and was admitted to
practice before the District of Columbia Bar. He joined his father's law
firm, which was renamed Houston & Houston. A few months later

5.

Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-EdgedSword: CharlesHamilton Houston

and JudicialActivism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 19 (1998).
6. Charles Hamilton Houston, Saving The World For Democracy, PITTSBURGH
COURIER, Aug. 24, 1940.
7. MCNEIL, supra note 3, at 47.
8. Id. at 49-51.
9. Id. at 51.
10. Id. at 53-54.
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Houston joined the faculty at Howard Law School. During his time as
a junior faculty member, Houston taught various subjects and was
highly regarded by his students and colleagues. In 1927 Houston
prepared "A Survey of the Status and Activities of Negro Lawyers in the
United States."" To conduct the research, he traveled to several cities
and eventually completed three studies: "Negro Law Schools," "The
Negro Lawyer," and "The Negro and His Contact With the Administration of the Law."' 2 During the same period, he developed a separate
study for the law school: "Survey of Howard University Law Students." 3
In May 1929, Houston prepared another study titled
"Personal Observations on the Summary of Studies in Legal Education
as applied to Howard University School of Law."' 4 In this twenty-page
document, Houston discussed the status of legal education at Howard,
the objectives of the school, the curriculum, the instruction methods, and
proposed research goals. Houston also outlined his vision of Howard's
role in legal education. Houston believed that institutional racism could
be effectively challenged through innovative litigation."' To accomplish
this vision, a group of well-trained lawyers would be needed to handle
the lawsuits that would make the Constitution's promise of Equal
Protection a reality.
Shortly before Houston joined the law faculty, the university's
administration became concerned about the law school's academic
standing. In 1920 the Board of Trustees voted "that steps be taken to
so advance the School of Law that it may become eligible for membership in the American Association of Law Schools." 6 A bout with
tuberculosis forced Houston to take a leave of absence during the 192829 academic year. When Houston returned, the dean was appointed
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Claims. Not long afterward,
"the Board appointed Charles H[amilton] Houston Resident Vice-Dean
in charge of the three-year Day School along with general supervision of
the Law School Library, beginning July 1, 1929."' 7 Although Booth
retained the title of Acting Dean until 1930, Houston immediately
assumed responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the school. After
his appointment he began almost immediately to upgrade the quality of

11.

Id. at 263 n.25.

12. Id. at 263 n.27.
13. Id. at 68.
14. Id. at 70.

15. Id.
16. RAYFORD W. LOGAN, HOWARD UNIVERSITY: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1867-1967,
225 (1969).

17. Id. at 267.
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instruction."8 Admission standards were raised; personnel changes
were undertaken; and significant improvements were made to the law
library. By October 1930, the law school employed four full-time
professors and one full-time librarian. It had a library of 10,000 volumes
and an adequate facility on Fifth Street.
The accrediting authorities reacted favorably to these accomplishments. Following a 1930 inspection, the law school was accredited by
the American Bar Association, and on December 28, 1931, it was elected
to the American Association of Law Schools "without qualification." 9
Several years later, William H. Hastie, a federal judge who served as
Dean of the law school in the 1940s, stated that from 1929-1935 Houston
"carried the institution from the status of an unaccredited and little
known-though undoubtedly useful-institution to a fully accredited
nationally known and respected law school taking its place with the
ranking schools of the nation." 0
Houston's goal involved more than upgrading Howard's academic
standing. He intended to train a generation of African-American
lawyers who would lead the fight against discrimination. 1 Years later
Judge Robert Carter explained:
The overriding theory of legal education at Howard during those years
was that the United States Constitution-in particular, the Civil War
Amendments-was a powerful force heretofore virtually untapped, that
should be used for social engineering in race relations ....

A principal

objective of the faculty at Howard was to produce lawyers capable of
structuring and litigating test cases that would provide effective
of these guarantees on behalf of the black communiimplementation
22
ty.

The legal campaign was developed and implemented almost entirely
by African-American lawyers. This was no accident. In a 1935
article, 28 Houston explained that African-Americans could not rely on
white lawyers to protect their rights. White lawyers, he explained, were
the beneficiaries of the discriminatory practices that Houston intended
18. Robert L. Carter, In Tribute: CharlesHamilton Houston, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2149,
2151 (1998).
19. LOGAN, supra note 16, at 267.
20. Id.; see also G. WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRAcE UNDER PRESSURE (1984).
21. Dean Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Walter J. Leonard, CharlesHamilton Houston and the
Search for a Just Society, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 11, 11 (1996).
22. Robert Carter, A Tribute to Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARVARD L. REv. 33, 36-37
(1991). Judge Carter attended Howard Law School in the 1940s. After graduation he

became Thurgood Marshall's principal assistant at the Legal Defense Fund. Judge Carter
handled the trial in Brown and argued the case in the Supreme Court.
23. Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49 (1935).
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to eliminate.24 Houston also stated his views about the role of black
lawyers and described the legal training that these lawyers would need.
Houston wrote: "The social justification for the Negro lawyer as such in
the United States today is the service he can render the race as an
interpreter and proponent of its rights and aspiration[s]." 2 5 After
describing the dearth of African-American lawyers who were active in
the 1930s, Houston illuminated his statistics with the following
observation:
The census reports [four] Negro lawyers to the 944,834 Negroes in
Alabama; [one] Negro lawyer to every 236,208 Alabama Negroes. The
State of Alabama has an area of 51,998 square miles. If the [four]
Negro lawyers were given cars and told to patrol the state like
policemen, each lawyer would have a beat of 12,999 square miles.2"
Houston also described the hostile environments that existed in the
Southern states and explained the financial sacrifices that black lawyers
could expect. Despite these obstacles he went on to urge that "it is
where the pressure is greatest and racial antagonisms most acute that27
the services of the Negro lawyer as a social engineer are needed."
Finally, he explained:
If a Negro law school is to make its full contribution to the social
system it must train its students and send them into just such situations. This does not necessarily mean a different course of instruction
from that in other standard law schools. But it does mean a difference
in emphasis ....
In their published recollections, Houston's students remembered him
as an exacting taskmaster who did not tolerate mediocre performance.2 9
During the early weeks of each school term he admonished first-year
students with the now familiar warning: "Look to your left and look to
your right ... next year one of you won't be here." ° As William Hastie
explained, "In serious pursuits he was tough, combative and unsentimental, demanding excellence of himself and of his students and professional
24. Id. at 49.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 51. Houston frequently used the term "Social Engineer" to express his
concept of a lawyer's obligation to society. This term was meant to convey a special sense
of mission that went beyond the traditional functions lawyers served. See, e.g., Michael
Wilson Reed, The Contribution of CharlesHamilton Houston to American Jurisprudence,
30 HOW. L.J. 1095, 1097 (1987).
28. Houston, supra note 23, at 51.
29. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, A Mentor's Legacy, 78 JUN A.B.A.J. 62 (1992).
30. MCNEIL, supra note 3, at 82.
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colleagues, though in social relations he was warm, always approachable
and held in great affection."31 Houston's dedication to unremitting
hard work was made clear in his favorite expression, "[nlo tea for the
feeble no crepe for the dead." 32 Thurgood Marshall recalled that
"Houston's drive earned for him the 'affectionate' nickname 'Iron
Shoes.'"33 Houston's demands on his students were based on more than
a desire to train competent professionals. He was preparing a generation of lawyers to engage in a legal revolution. This was the "difference
in emphasis" to which Houston referred.34
III.

THE MARGOLD REPORT

Not long after it was organized, the NAACP established a steering
committee that supported legal actions on behalf of African-Americans
who were victimized by discrimination. Over the years, several cases
were brought on behalf of various plaintiffs, but litigation was not the
focus of the organization's efforts. An event that would alter the
NAACP's direction occurred in 1922 when Charles Garland, the son of
a Boston millionaire, donated $800,000 to establish a fund to support
radical causes. The Garland Fund was administered by a group of
liberal activists that included James Weldon Johnson, the Executive
Secretary of the NAACP; Roger Baldwin, the founder of the American
Civil Liberties Union; Morris Ernst; Lewis Gannett; and Norman
Thomas. As Johnson explained in his autobiography,
the American Fund for Public Service was organized and chartered,
mainly through the efforts of Roger N. Baldwin, who was a friend of
Mr. Garland, for the express purpose of taking over and administering
this money ....[Garland] turned his inheritance over merely with the
request that it be given away as quickly aspossible, and to "unpopular"
causes, without regard to race, creed or color.3"
In 1929, Johnson, Gannett, and Ernst established a Committee on
Negro Work to focus on the problems of black Americans. The commit-

31. Spottswood W. Robinson III, No Tea For the Feeble: Two Perspectives of Charles
Hamilton Houston, 20 How. L.J. 1, 3 (1977). These remarks were delivered at a 1976
ceremony in which William Hastie was posthumously awarded the Charles Hamilton
Houston Medallion of Merit by the Washington Bar Association. The first half of this
Article consists of Hastie's unfinished draft speech.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Letter from Thurgood Marshall, February 27, 1963, quoted in GERALDINE R. SEGAL,
IN ANY FIGHT SOME FALL 34 (1975).
34. Houston, supra note 23, at 51.
35.

JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, ALONG THIS WAY:

WELDON JOHNSON 385-86 (Penguin Books 1990) (1933).
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tee drafted a proposal recommending that the Fund award a grant to the
NAACP to carry out large-scale legal campaigns to enforce the Constitutional rights of African-Americans in the South.
After the Fund approved the grant, a special committee was established to administer the appropriation. The grant was announced with
an explanation that it was intended to assist in areas such as unequal
apportionment of school funds, barring negroes from juries, residential
segregation, disenfranchisement, and civil liberties defense.36 The
NAACP stated that it would find a "very able lawyer" to review the
relevant legal authorities, develop an overall strategy, and supervise the
cases that would be filed.37 After the grant was approved, Walter
White, who became the NAACP's Executive Secretary after Johnson's
retirement, began to search for a candidate to fill the position. After
reviewing several candidates, White narrowed the search to William
Hastie, a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, and Nathan Margold,
another Harvard graduate who had served on the HarvardLaw Review
with Charles Houston. Because of Hastie's relative youth and inexperience, White settled on Margold, who was hired on October 4, 1930.
Nathan Margold prepared a comprehensive report that analyzed the
Constitutional foundations of Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrine and
recommended a strategy to attack segregation. Margold's report was
submitted in three separate installments. The Margold Report,3 8 which
consisted of 218 typed pages, would have a profound effect on the
NAACP's activities for the next several years. It contained a comprehensive analysis of laws and applicable legal precedents beginning with
Plessy. After analyzing the turn-of-the-century decisions, the report
worked its way through the laws governing segregation up to 1931.
Despite the weight of legal authority supporting segregation, Margold
suggested a means by which the legal obstacles might be overcome.
His analysis included a number of significant conclusions that would
eventually become critical to the NAACP's legal strategy. As the
NAACP had determined in earlier surveys, Margold confirmed that the
separate-but-equal doctrine as practiced was always separate but never
equal. In public schools, there were obvious inequities in the resources
allocated to white schools as compared to those provided to schools that
served black students. Yet, there were cases that found that absolute
equality in funding was not required as long as some provision was

36. Committee Report, May 28, 1930, PAPERS OF THE NAACP PART 3: THE CAMPAIGN
FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY, 1913-1950, Series A-Reel 1, Frame 360.
37. Id. at Frame 365.
38. MargoldReport, PAPERS OF THE NAACP, PART 3: THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL
EQUALITY, 1913, 1950, Series A. Reel 4, Frames 560-772.
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made for both races.3 9 There was also a long-standing judicial policy
of deferring to local authorities in matters involving the administration
of educational systems. Margold also found that numerous defenses
were available to the local school boards.
The NAACP's original proposal suggested the simultaneous filing of
several suits in various districts across the South. Rejecting this
approach, Margold believed "[iut would be a great mistake to fritter away
our limited funds on sporadic attempts to force the making of equal
divisions of school funds in the few instances where such attempts might
be expected to succeed."4 ° Margold's main conclusion was that segregation as practiced was unconstitutional even if the Plessy rationale were
accepted.
The system was, in reality, "segregation coupled with
discrimination."41 Margold recommended that a series of lawsuits
seeking declaratory judgments would be preferable to actions seeking to
require the school authorities to pursue a specific course of action.
Margold argued that "if we boldly challenge the constitutional validity
of segregation if and when accompanied irremediably by discrimination,
we can strike directly at the most prolific sources of discrimination."42
Finally, in what was the key conclusion of his report, Margold argued
that "segregation coupled with discrimination resulting from administrative action ... is just as much a denial of equal protection of the laws as
is segregation coupled with discrimination required by express statutory
enactment."43
The Margold Report became the foundation of the NAACP's strategy
against segregation. Its central thesis was one that the NAACP had
already documented. Segregation was a crude fiction in which the
facilities provided for African-Americans were patently inferior to those
reserved for whites.
Using the Plessy doctrine, Southern states
established facilities for blacks that were demonstrably inferior to those
provided for whites. Despite the obvious inequities, the desirability of
segregation was not seriously questioned by the vast majority of white
Americans. It was accepted as the natural order in the South and was
widely practiced in Northern states. As Margold suggested, an
evidentiary demonstration of inequality in a particular school district
was unlikely to result in any lasting changes even if the NAACP

39. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
Ironically the decision in Cumming was authored by Justice Harlan, who had written the

dissent in Plessy arguing that the Constitution was "color-blind."
40.
41.
42.
43.

See supra note 38, at Frame 647.
Id. at Frame 648.
Id. at Frame 647.
Id. at Frame 648.
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prevailed. Margold argued for a more dramatic approach-a direct legal
challenge to the entire system.
Margold submitted his report to the NAACP's Board of Directors in
1931. Although the findings and recommendations were what the
NAACP hoped to receive, nearly four years passed before the organization could act on Margold's suggestions. By the time the NAACP was
prepared to take action, the prospects of receiving the $100,000
originally promised had evaporated in the stock market crash of 1929
and the depression of the 1930s.
IV. - THE EQUALIZATION STRATEGY
After submitting his report, Margold accepted a full-time position as
an Assistant Solicitor at the Department of Interior. This change left
vacant the anticipated position for a full-time attorney to direct the
litigation campaign. Walter White settled on Charles Houston as the
ideal person for the position. Prior to joining the NAACP's staff,
Houston prepared a memorandum for a Joint Committee of the Garland
Fund and the NAACP in which he outlined what became the equalization strategy." With a budget of $10,000, Houston undertook the task
of formulating plans for an unprecedented campaign of long-range
litigation. 45 Because of the diminished grant, the Joint Committee
lowered its sights to legal challenges against discrimination in education
and public transportation. After considering what a campaign like this
would entail, Houston recommended a still narrower focus. Despite the
limited resources, Houston predicted that carefully targeted suits would
stimulate public interest and encourage the affected communities to
continue the fight after the NAACP led the way with test cases. In a
memorandum to the Joint Committee, Houston wrote:
On a budget of $10,000.00 it is exceedingly difficult to execute an
effective program on a national scale on two issues as large as discrimination in education and discrimination. in transportation. Isolated
suits mean little unless the communities and persons affected believe
there is an unexpended reserve available to sustain a persistent
struggle. This calls for concentration of effort.46
Houston's memorandum presented two separate proposals. One was
based on an assumption that the entire effort would focus on education
cases. The second budget proposed an equal division of the funds

44. MCNEIL, supra note 3, at 116.
45. See Genna Rae McNeil, In Tribute: CharlesHamilton Houston, 111 HARv. L. REV.
2167, 2170 (1998).
46. See supra note 36, at Frame 858.
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between education and transportation litigation. Houston believed that
education was the more important goal because of the benefits that
would be derived by the African-American students while the campaign
was still in progress. He recommended a two-pronged attack: one
against unequal allocation of school funds and the other against
differentials in teacher salaries. Houston explained that his goals were:
"(1) to arouse and strengthen the will of the local communities to
demand and fight for their rights; (2) to work out model procedures
through actual tests in court which can be used by local communities in
similar cases brought by them on their own initiative and resources. "
In this 1934 memorandum, Houston proposed what would become the
NAACP's equalization strategy. This approach would be carried out over
the next several years in hundreds of cases and would ultimately result
in the reversal of the Plessy doctrine. Margold's legal analysis was
sound, and his approach would be adopted by the NAACP's lawyers
several years later. However, Houston believed that the Supreme Court
was not prepared to respond favorably to a direct challenge to Plessy. 48
Under Houston's direction a different strategy was devised.
Focusing on education, Houston proposed a series of lawsuits
demanding that states comply with Plessy by providing equal allocations
of financial and other resources for black students in segregated schools.
This would be followed by a second series of suits demanding equal
salaries for black teachers. 49 As Robert Carter explained some years
later,
underlying this strategy was the belief that the segregation system
would eventually implode-in other words, that the financial burden
of having duplicate educational systems for blacks and whites in the
various professions would become so great that the states would be
forced to abandon segregation all together at the graduate and professional school level. 50
Houston did not underestimate the scope of the task he proposed and the
scarce resources that were available. Yet, he believed that successful
cases would stimulate enough local support to sustain the effort long
after the national office moved on to other projects.

47. Id. at Frame 859.
48. In a 1926 decision, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), the Supreme Court relied
on Plessy to sustain a Mississippi segregation statute. Id. at 86-87. In the mid-1930s the
Court struck down virtually all of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislation.
This was not a Court that would welcome radical changes in the existing order.
49. Collins J. Seitz, Surveying the Groundwork, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1046, 1050 (1985).
50. Carter, supra note 22, at 33-42.
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Part of Houston's confidence was based on the success of his earlier
efforts. Houston's transformation of Howard had borne fruit. Howard
graduates had established practices in cities and towns throughout the
South. Houston was confident that these lawyers would volunteer to
handle cases. What was important from an organizational perspective
was to demonstrate how the cases could be handled by filing test cases
and developing model pleadings.51 After the Joint Committee approved
the proposal, Houston applied for a leave of absence from Howard and
began to make preparations to move to New York.5 2 He arrived there
on July 11, 1935, and found a room at the Harlem Branch of the
YMCA.5 3 On the next day he reported to work at the NAACP headquarters at 69 Fifth Avenue.
V. ExECUTING THE STATEGY

A.

Findinga Test Case
Before he joined the NAACP on a full-time basis, from January 1,
1935, through July 28, 1935, Houston drove more than 10,000 miles to
various destinations in connection with his NAACP duties. These
activities included delivering several addresses to local branches of the
NAACP and other civic organizations, making visits to lawyers and other
individuals involved in NAACP cases, and handling cases for the
NAACP. The pace accelerated after Houston moved to New York.
Shortly after he assumed his new position, events that would lead to his
first important case began to unfold in Baltimore, Maryland.
Donald Gaines Murray applied for admission to the Law School of the
University of Maryland in 1935. Although two African-Americans had
graduated from the law school several years earlier, in 1920 the State
of Maryland approved legislation that required segregated schools. As
in other states that practiced segregation, the quality of facilities
provided for the black students of Maryland were far below those
provided for whites.
By 1935 the desire to improve educational opportunities extended well
beyond the Civil Rights activists who were associated with the NAACP.
The number of black students attending institutions of higher learning
had been rising steadily during the previous decade. Houston's activities
at Howard produced dozens of young African-American lawyers who

51.
52.
53.

MCNEIL, supra note 3, at 116.
Charles H. Houston Will Join N.AA.C.P. Staff in July, CRISIS, July 1935, at 208.
MCNEIL, supra note 3, at 127.
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were anxious to apply Houston's theories to actual cases. None was
more eager than Thurgood Marshall, one of Houston's star students.
Marshall graduated at the top of his class in 1933 and established a
busy, though far-from-lucrative practice in Baltimore, Maryland. The
fees that Marshall earned were not enough to support a family. Despite
this, Marshall managed to handle several cases for the NAACP on a
volunteer basis. One of these became the first successful equalization
54
case.
Not long after Marshall returned to Baltimore, Alpha Phi Alpha, a
black fraternity, began to organize an effort to force the desegregation
of the University of Maryland. This effort was led by Belford Lawson,
a Washington, D.C. attorney who was counsel to the fraternity. Lawson
enlisted the aid of the Washington Branch of the NAACP and the New
Negro Alliance to assist him. After Marshall became aware of Lawson's
activities, he wrote Houston in New York to inquire whether the
NAACP's national office would be interested in backing the litigation.
Houston did not immediately respond.55
In November 1934 Lawson invited Marshall and William Gosnell,
another Baltimore attorney, to a meeting. After Marshall sent another
letter to the NAACP, Houston replied with a telegram instructing
Marshall to attend the meeting but cautioning him to avoid making any
commitments. At the meeting, Lawson outlined his plans and asked
whether Gosnell or Marshall knew of any potential plaintiffs. A few
weeks later Gosnell suggested Donald Gaines Murray, a 1934 graduate
of Amherst College. Murray was an ideal plaintiff. He was articulate,
had a pleasant appearance, and had impeccable educational credentials.
After Murray agreed to become the plaintiff, Houston decided to take the
case under the auspices of the NAACP.
In the AFPS/NAACP report submitted in March 1935, Houston
described the status of the University of Maryland case. Murray's
application, he explained, had been submitted and rejected by the
university solely on the ground of his race. In their response, university
officials suggested that Murray apply to Princess Ann Academy, which
had been established for black students. Because the Princess Ann
Academy had very limited facilities for college training and no provisions
for graduate or professional training, Houston decided this would be a
good opportunity to test the equalization strategy.
Houston outlined a number of possible actions depending upon the
specific manner in which the university officials responded to the

54. RANDALL W. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW: THE LEGAL CAREER OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL, 1934-1991, 3-7 (rev. ed. 1993) (1973).
55. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 186 (1975).
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demands that Houston and Marshall were making on Murray's behalf.
Houston also stated that he intended to file a mandamus action that
would seek to compel Murray's admission to the university. After
considering Houston's recommendations, the Joint Committee passed a
formal resolution that authorized Houston to "proceed at once with the
case against the University of Maryland." 56 With this action, the
NAACP embarked on what would become a decades-long campaign to
eliminate formal segregation. After receiving the Joint Committee's
approval, Houston filed a civil action in Baltimore City Court against the
University of Maryland.57 The case was tried before Judge Eugene
O'Dunne in June 1935. Murray was represented by Houston, Marshall,
and William Gosnell. The university was represented by Charles T.
LeViness, III, an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maryland.58
1. Murray v. The University of Maryland: The Trial. Houston
led off with an opening argument on Murray's behalf. Summarizing the
facts, Houston explained that Murray had applied for admission to the
University of Maryland's Law School and that he satisfied the prerequisites for admission but his application had been denied solely on the
basis of his race. These actions, Houston asserted, violated Murray's
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.59 After Houston completed his opening, Assistant Attorney
General LeViness responded. LeViness argued that the public policy of
the State of Maryland required the exclusion of black students from
schools reserved for white students.' There had been no demand for
higher education by black students until relatively recently, he added.
The State satisfied the demand by establishing Princess Ann Academy,
as well as out-of-state scholarships for black students who wanted to
attend graduate schools.
Judge O'Dunne interrupted LeViness, asking him what public policy
had to do with the case. LeViness responded by stating that segregation
was the State's policy, even though no state law specifically required
segregated educational facilities at the graduate level. 6 Evidencing

56. Minutes of AFPS/NAACP Joint Committee Meeting, March 21, 1935 PAPERS OF THE
NAACP, PART 3: THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY, 1913-1950, Series A. Reel
4, Frame 00008.
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some skepticism toward the State's position, Judge O'Dunne asked how
a $200 scholarship would cover all of the costs of attending a university
outside of the state. O'Dunne asked LeViness whether the State would
stipulate that Murray satisfied all of the academic qualifications for
admission. The assistant attorney general reluctantly conceded this
point.
After the conclusion of the opening statements, Houston called
plaintiff as his first witness. Murray took the stand and testified about
his life-long residency in Maryland, his desire to attend law school
within the state, and his unsuccessful efforts to secure admission to the
state university. After Murray concluded his testimony, Houston called
as his next witness Dr. Raymond A. Pearson, president of the university.
Houston's skills as a trial attorney were legendary among those who saw
him at work. Pearson spent an extremely uncomfortable hour and a half
on the witness stand. His evasive statements could not stand up to
Houston's withering examination. In fact, Houston used the testimony
of university officials to establish all of his major points. First, Houston
forced Pearson to confirm that Murray's application had gone through
the proper channels and that Murray's record at Amherst satisfied all
of the academic standards for admission.62 Next, Houston compelled
Pearson to admit that out-of-state scholarships were not available at the
time Murray's application was rejected.63 During subsequent questions,
Pearson conceded that appropriations voted by the legislature were
insufficient to satisfy the demands of the numerous scholarship
applicants. After Dr. Pearson claimed that the state had made adequate
provisions for black students at Princess Ann Academy, Houston led him
through a step-by-step comparison of the two facilities.
Houston began with an examination of the qualifications of the
faculties at the two schools and moved on to the physical facilities.
During this line of questioning, Pearson was unable to explain how a
chemistry laboratory at Princess Ann Academy consisting of a single
table, a few test tubes, and a butterfly case was equal to the state-of-theart facilities at the main campus.64 Houston also established that the
majority of the faculty members at Princess Ann Academy did not have
advanced degrees and that salaries at Princess Ann Academy were far
lower than those at the main campus. Comparisons along these lines
continued throughout Houston's examination. It was, of course, clear to
everyone present that the provisions made for African-American
students were grossly inferior to the resources available to whites.
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After Pearson concluded his testimony, Houston called as his next
witness Roger Howell, the Dean of the University of Maryland's Law
School. During Houston's direct examination, Howell made several
damaging admissions. The most significant of these consisted of
Howell's concession that several of the courses taught at the law school
focused on state law.65 This admission established that students
attending law schools outside of Maryland were placed at a disadvantage.
After Dean Howell concluded his testimony, J. Walter Huffington, the
state Supervisor of Education, was called to the stand. The State's
attorneys hoped that Huffington's testimony would show that the State
had allocated substantially equal resources for black students. During
cross-examination, however, Huffington conceded that black teachers
were paid less and that black students attended school for fewer months
each year than white students.
The next witness to testify was Albert Cook, the state Superintendent
of Education. Cook's testimony established inequities in the allocation
of resources at the high school level. Another witness, Dr. John 0.
Spencer, the President of Morgan College, a private institution that
served black students, was called to the stand. Dr. Spencer testified
that students who completed Princess Ann Academy, which the State
contended was a two-year junior college, were not admitted to Morgan
as juniors because they did not receive adequate preparation at Princess
Ann Academy."6 After Spencer completed his testimony, he was
followed by W. M. Hillegist, the University's Registrar and Robert P.
McGuinn, Executive Secretary of the Governor's Commission on Higher
Education. Hillegist testified that nine blacks had applied for admission
to the University of Maryland since 1933.67 This testimony undermined the State's claim about low demand for graduate education.
McGuinn testified that 380 applications were pending for the fifty out-ofstate scholarships that were available. 8
Houston and Marshall shared the closing argument. Marshall began
with a discussion of the precedent governing the obligation of states to
provide equal educational opportunities for black students. Carefully
remaining within the confines of Plessy, Marshall argued that the state
had a constitutional obligation to provide equal educational opportunities
for students of all races. Maryland, he argued, violated that require-
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ment when it established a publicly-funded law school for whites without
making adequate arrangements for black students.
Houston concluded the argument by emphasizing that no state law
barred black students from attending publicly-funded institutions.
Houston emphasized that Plessy obligated the State to make equal
educational opportunities available to students of both races. Maryland
violated its constitutional duty by failing to do so. The out-of-state
scholarships, he argued, did not satisfy the State's legal obligations
because they were non-existent when Murray's application was rejected
and could not satisfy the current demand. At the conclusion of the
hearing, Judge O'Dunne issued a ruling from the bench. He found the
university had a legal obligation to offer the same educational opportunities for black students as those provided to whites. Because the State
had failed to fulfill its constitutional duty, the judge issued a writ of
mandamus compelling the university to admit Murray to the class that
was scheduled to enter in the fall.6"
A few days after the conclusion of the trial in Murray, the NAACP
convened its 1935 annual meeting in St. Louis, Missouri. Houston was
unable to attend, so he submitted a written report of his activities to the
Conference.7 ° He advised the Association that a possible hearing in the
Murray appeal prevented him from appearing in person but that the
NAACP had won "a significant victory in the [Maryland] trial court,
which if it can be held all the way to the United States Supreme Court
will mean the opening up, in one form or another, of professional and
graduate education for Negroes in all the States."7 Houston stated
that a full report of the trial from the Baltimore Afro-American was
being sent to the Conference. Houston informed the organization that
he was formulating model procedures that, with minor modifications,
could be used in similar cases any place in the country.7 2
He went on to report that several cases had been filed by Howard
graduates who had been in contact with him. Houston noted optimistically that:
[Tihe most hopeful sign about our legal defense is the ever increasing
number of young Negro Lawyers, competent, conscientious and
courageous, who are anxious to pit themselves against the forces or
[sic] reaction and injustice. In most of these cases these young lawyers
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have served without fee; in non [sic] case has a fee been charged
commensurate with the service rendered. The time is soon coming
when the Negro will be able to rely on his own lawyers to give him
every legal protection in every Court, no matter [the situation]., 3
The report concluded with a summary of Houston's other activities and
closed with a description of how the campaign against segregation would
proceed, including confronting issues of discrimination in per capita cost
of education, in teacher salaries, in transportation, and in professional
and graduate education. During the convention a film was shown that
Houston prepared with the assistance of a former student, Edward
Lovett. During the months prior to the convention, Houston traveled in
South Carolina. While there he filmed several black schools and white
schools. This film, along with charts Houston prepared graphically,
documented the racial disparities in South Carolina.
Houston drafted a report that was submitted to the Joint Committee
of the AFPS/NAACP. After describing the success in Murray and the
coverage it received in the black press, Houston made an observation
that reflected a mixture of disappointment and hope. He wrote that at
the time Murray went to trial:
Interest on the part of Negroes was not keen. The court room was not
crowded when the case was tried. Several persons have said that the
reason Negroes did not take more interest in the case was because they
felt it was hopeless. Much more interest is now being manifested since
Judge O'Dunne's order. One indication is the fact that a number of
Negroes have applied for admission to the school since that time. 4
Two additional items of significance were included in this report. The
first concerned proposed teacher salary litigation. Houston noted that
the "Afro-American [newspaper] is very much interested and active in
obtaining a qualified teacher to bring suit for equalization of teachers'
pay in Maryland. It is probable that this case will be filed before
September."75 The second item related to what would become the next
graduate school case. Houston wrote that "the favorable Court decision
in [Murray] will encourage similar suits in other states. Already Sidney
R. Redmond, Esq., of St. Louis, Missouri, is investigating discrimination
and exclusion at the University of Missouri." 6
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2. Pearsonv. Murray: The Appeal. After the trial court entered
its decision, the attorneys for the State of Maryland filed an appeal.
Oral arguments in the Murray appeal took place in the fall of 1935. The
court of appeals decision was issued on January 15, 1936. 77 The State
sought reversal of the trial court's decision on three separate grounds.
First, the university argued that it was a private entity rather than a
state agency and so was not obligated to comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The State also claimed that even if the university were
deemed to be a governmental unit, the State had satisfied its obligation
by establishing a separate school for black students. The State's final
argument was that, to the extent it was required to provide graduate
educational opportunities for black students, its obligations had been
satisfied by establishing a scholarship fund, which black students could
use to attend schools outside of Maryland.
The first argument was rejected almost summarily. The court found
that the university became a state agency when it was consolidated with
the Maryland College of Agriculture.7" In the court's view there was
"no escape from the conclusion that the school is now a branch or agency
of the State government."79 The court then turned its attention to
whether the educational facilities maintained for black students were
equal to those provided for whites. After acknowledging that Plessy
authorized segregated schools, the court emphasized that "separation of
the races must nevertheless furnish equal treatment." 0
Because the State did not have a law school for black students, "the
main question in this case [was] whether the separation can be
maintained, and negroes excluded from the present school, by reason of
equality of treatment furnished the latter in scholarships for studying
outside the state.""1 The scholarships, the court found, could not
provide the basis for a defense because they were not available at the
time Murray's application was rejected. 2 Furthermore, funds that
were subsequently appropriated were not adequate to satisfy the
demands of the students who had applied for state aid. 3 Finally, even
if a black student received a scholarship, it would not have covered the
costs of attending law school in another state because the scholarship
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only covered tuition differentials." For these reasons, the court held
that the "slender chance for any one applicant at an opportunity to
attend an outside law school at increased expense, falls short of
providing for students of the colored race facilities substantially equal
to those furnished to the whites in the law school maintained at
Baltimore."86 After holding that Murray had been denied Equal
Protection of the law, the court considered the question of relief.86 It
found that "the erection of a separate school [was] not an available
alternative remedy." 7 As a consequence, it affirmed the trial court's
order requiring Murray's admission to the University of Maryland.8 8
Murray represented a solid victory for Houston, Marshall and the
NAACP. In their first major case after launching the litigation
campaign, the NAACP's lawyers won a judgment that broke through the
racial barriers erected by Plessy. The Maryland Court recognized that
the mere provision of some facilities for black students did not satisfy
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decision was a stunning accomplishment and its
implications were far-reaching. No state that created separate school
systems had attempted to establish anything resembling equality. If the
holding in Murray were adopted in other jurisdictions, the states would
be faced with the burden of equalizing the educational facilities.
Houston was certain that the maintenance of separate, but actually
equal, systems was a burden no state could afford to bear. Segregation
would eventually break down under its own weight.
Another important aspect of Murray was the relief that the court
granted. The court could have ordered the State to establish a separate
school for black students and given it a period of time to comply with its
order. In the alternative, the court could have required the State to
increase the amount of the out-of-state scholarships to cover the actual
costs of attending schools in other states. Finally, the court could have
simply declared that the State's actions fell short of its obligations under
the Fourteenth Amendment and allowed the State to develop its own
plan of compliance. By ordering Murray's admission to the law school,
the court forestalled any delaying tactics that might have been devised.
The decision in Murray sent a galvanizing message of hope to a black
community that had all but resigned itself to permanent second-class
status. Throughout the years that he served as special counsel to the
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NAACP, Houston complained about the apathy he encountered. In a
1935 memorandum Houston observed that:
The difficulty which has developed and which has prevented the
program from being pushed more vigorously is the degree of apathy on
the part of the Negro population. Conservative Negroes are afraid of
the program ....

It is astonishing to know the lack of knowledge and

indifference on the part of the public in general to the question of
Negro education. 9
Murray was a much needed victory.
several years later,

As William Hastie recalled

throughout the first third of this century, the effective institutionalization of racism was the common experience of most Negroes. "Settled"
American law required and sanctioned such rigid and comprehensive
segregation and subordination of blacks that, to most people, even talk
of any significant movement toward an equalitarian legal order seemed
visionary, or even foolish.'
As Hastie's comments suggest, by the early 1930s most AfricanAmericans had resigned themselves to subordinated status. Murray
provided a critical boost for the Civil Rights movement.
As Houston predicted, lawyers in other states were encouraged by the
decision in Murray to bring similar suits in other jurisdictions. Black
students who were anxious to expand their educational opportunities
were willing to take the substantial risks involved in becoming plaintiffs
in Civil Rights litigation. The courage to demand equal rights was aided
immeasurably by Houston's victory in Murray. Houston showed that
African-Americans could challenge segregation in the courts and prevail
against what many considered insurmountable odds.
B.

The Role of Black Bar Associations
One of the cornerstones of Houston's legal strategy involved the use
of African-American lawyers to handle Civil Rights cases. One of the
means by which this strategy was facilitated was the National Bar
Association ("NBA"), which was founded in August 1925 in Des Moines,
Iowa.9 The NBA evolved from the Iowa Negro Bar Association, which
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was organized in 1902 by George H. Woodson. Woodson served as
President of the Iowa group for several years. The first meeting of the
NBA was attended by black attorneys from Iowa, Kansas City, and
Chicago. Woodson was elected to serve as the first president of the
NBA. Articles of Incorporation were filed in Polk County, Iowa, on July
29, 1926. Among the organization's purposes was "'to form a nationwide organization of practicing attorneys of the Negro race."'92
The NBA grew rapidly, adding as affiliate chapters existing or newly
organized black bar associations across the country. Houston was a
founding member of the Washington Bar Association, which was
established in 1925 in Washington, D.C. and later became the District
of Columbia's NBA affiliate."3 Houston's father, William Houston,
served as president of the NBA from 1937-1938. The organization was
critical to black lawyers during this period because segregation excluded
them from the American Bar Association and local bar associations. The
NBA and its local affiliates provided a critical link to colleagues within
the profession.
Beginning in 1926, the NBA held yearly conventions at which black
lawyers from across the nation gathered. This practice gave them an
opportunity to meet, compare notes, and discuss issues of importance to
practicing lawyers. Eventually, an interlocking network of lawyers
spread itself across the country. Most of the lawyers were Howard
graduates. They were members of the NBA and saw each other at least
yearly at NBA conventions. Finally, the same lawyers were active in
local branches of the NAACP. These associations formed a vast network
in which the NAACP, Howard Law School, and the NBA provided the
critical links. As NBA President Raymond Pace Alexander explained in
1941:
The Negro Bar, most of whom are members of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, many of the officers, directors,
and most active of the membership being either members of the Legal
Committee of the N.A.A.C.P. or officers in their respective city
branches, have since the formation of the Bar Association, given active
support to the many important cases involving the civil and political
rights of the Negro which have been brought in the various courts
throughout the country. 4
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C. Gaines v. University of Missouri
The value of this network of African-American lawyers was reflected
in the way in which the next equalization case was orchestrated. A St.
Louis lawyer, Sidney Redmond, recommended the case to Houston.
Redmond was a 1923 graduate of Harvard College. He received a law
degree from Harvard University in 1927. He moved to St. Louis from
Mississippi in 1929, became active in the St. Louis Chapter of the
NAACP, and later served as President of the NBA. When Redmond
recommended that the NAACP file a case on behalf of a black student
in Missouri, Houston agreed.
Lloyd Gaines was a 1935 graduate of Lincoln University in Jefferson
City, Missouri. He applied to the University of Missouri's Law School.
After his application was denied, a civil action was filed on his behalf.
Sidney R. Redmond and Henry D. Espy of St. Louis (both of whom were
members of the Mound City Bar Association, the local affiliate of the
NBA) and Charles Houston represented Gaines. Houston traveled to St.
Louis to complete the final preparations a few days prior to the trial.
On July 10, 1935, the day of the trial, Houston rose at 4:15 a.m. to
prepare for the 120-mile drive to Columbia. By the time Gaines and the
other lawyers had assembled it was 6:00 a.m. An unanticipated detour
caused further delays. Houston, Redmond, Espy, and Gaines did not
arrive at the Boone County Courthouse until 9:15 a.m.95
It was an unusually hot summer. Boone County was suffering
through a severe drought. Dozens of farmers were in town to visit
officials at the county relief agencies located in the courthouse. Several
of the farmers wandered into the courtroom to watch the Gaines
proceedings. Nearly a hundred students who were attending a summer
session at the University of Missouri also crowded into the courtroom.
Before long the courtroom was filled to capacity. The opposing counsel
shook hands cordially, and they all shared a single table, an arrangement "odd to us," Houston reported later. 6 In a memorandum to his
office, Houston explained that "all during the trial we looked down one
another's throats. For private conferences at the table we almost had to
go into a football huddle." 7 Although the courtroom was filled with
spectators, there were no displays of overt hostility during the trial.
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Furthermore, unlike many courthouses during that period, the one in
Boone County was not segregated. Houston noted that during the
recess, some of the farmers "looked a little strange at us drinking out of
the same fountain and using the same lavatories with them, but they did
not say anything."9"
Houston reported that the university's lawyers, practitioners from a
Kansas City firm, were "driving and dramatic" in their opening
presentation.99 They argued that Gaines' remedy lay with the officials
of Lincoln University; he should have requested that Lincoln establish
a law school. During the trial university officials admitted that Gaines
was otherwise qualified for admission and was denied admission solely
on the basis of his race. The trial judge was obviously not receptive to
Houston's arguments. In the memorandum to his office, Houston
concluded that "it is beyond expectation that the court will decide in our
favor, so we had just as well get ready for the appeal."' 00 As Houston
expected, the trial judge entered a judgment for the university.10 '
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Houston
and Redmond argued the appeal. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's ruling, noting that "the established public policy of this
State has been, and now is, to segregate the white and Negro races."0 2
The court also found that the state laws requiring separate schools were
not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 3 Houston and Redmond argued that the laws requiring segregation did not extend to support colleges and universities.' 4 After
reviewing statutes establishing Lincoln University "for the higher
education for the Negro race," the court disagreed and held that there
was "a clear intention on the part of the Legislature to separate the
white and Negro races for the purpose of higher education."0 5 Houston and Redmond argued that the broadly worded statutory language,
which made state-supported higher education available to "all youths"
who were residents of Missouri, could not be interpreted to restrict
admission to white students.' ° In the court's view that interpretation
would be "at war" with other statutory provisions that evidenced "a clear
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and unmistakable intention on the part of the legislature to separate the
races for the purpose of higher education."" 7
Houston and Redmond also claimed that the university's actions
denied Gaines' rights to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. After explaining somewhat cryptically that "color
carries with it natural race peculiarities" and that "[tihese differences
create different social relations," the court relied on Plessy v. Ferguson
to conclude that "[e]quality, and not identity of privileges and rights, is
what is guaranteed to the citizen."0 s The court believed that "differences" in the black -and white races justified disparate treatment.'0 9
Equality did not mean that Gaines was entitled to the same education
that was made available to whites."0 Based on this reasoning, the
court held that Gaines would not be deprived of any rights in violation
of the Federal or Missouri Constitutions if the educational opportunities
provided by the State were "substantially equal to those furnished white
citizens of the State.""'
The court also found that Gaines had not applied for admission to
Lincoln University but that, if he had done so, the Board of Curators at
Lincoln would have been obligated to establish a law school "or furnish
him opportunity for legal training elsewhere, substantially equal to that
furnished white students at the University of Missouri."" 2 The court
noted that law schools at universities in adjacent states admitted black
students." 3 Those programs were as "sound, comprehensive [and]
valuable" as the University of Missouri's curriculum."" The court
observed that the distance Gaines would be required to travel to attend
law schools located in adjacent states would not be any greater than the
distance white residents in some areas of Missouri would travel to
attend the University of Missouri. n 5
In an attempt to avoid one of the critical weaknesses in the State's
position in the Maryland case, the Missouri court struck down a
statutory provision that would have limited the funds supplied to Gaines
to the difference between the tuition charged by the University of
Missouri and the cost of attending an out-of-state law school. 116
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held that Missouri would be required to pay "full tuition in the law
department of the university of an adjacent state."117
Houston and Redmond's final argument was that the Missouri court
should apply the Maryland court's reasoning in Murray."8 In the
court's view, however, the circumstances that prompted the Murray
decision in Maryland were "radically different" because, unlike Missouri,
Maryland had not made adequate provisions for black students as
Missouri had done with Lincoln University."9 Based on these findings, the Missouri court held "that the opportunity afforded [Gaines] for
a law education in the university of an adjacent State is substantially
equal to that offered to white students by the University of Missouri."120

Gaines was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 121 On the
day before the oral arguments, Houston rehearsed before a group of
students and professors at Howard University Law School. This
rehearsal was one of the first of several "dry runs" that were conducted
at Howard in Civil Rights cases. 22 On the following day, the university's lawyers argued that Gaines was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because "if, on the date when [Gaines] applied for admission to the
University of Missouri, he had instead applied to the curators of Lincoln
University it would have been their duty to establish a law school." 2 3
The Supreme Court found no such "mandatory duty" because the state
law on which the university relied left "to the judgment of the curators
to decide when it will be necessary and practicable to establish a law
school."' 24
More important, the Supreme Court acknowledged the realities of the
situation when it stated that "the fact remains that instruction in law
for Negroes is not now afforded by the State, either at Lincoln University or elsewhere within the State."'28 Based on these findings, the
Court reasoned that the critical issue was "the question [of] whether the
provision for the legal education in other States of [negro] resident[s] in
Missouri is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal
protection. " 12
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The Court reasoned that the quality of legal education provided by
states adjacent to Missouri was irrelevant. 127 The question was "what
opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to
negroes solely upon the ground of color."12 The Court found that each
state had an independent constitutional obligation to provide equal
educational opportunities and that this requirement could not be shifted
by one state to another.'29 The Court also concluded that the right to
equal protection is a "personal one."13 ° As a consequence, "the State
was bound to furnish [Gaines] within its borders facilities for legal
education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded for
persons of the white race."'' Because Missouri had failed to establish
a law school for African-American students, Gaines was entitled to
admission to the University of Missouri Law School.' 32
Gaines represented a major victory for the NAACP. The reasoning of
the Maryland court in Murray had been adopted by the United States
Supreme Court. This meant that Gaines had nationwide applicability
as a binding legal precedent. Murray was significant, but a victory in
the Supreme Court carried far more weight. Houston's "equalization"
strategy prevailed for a second time. The Supreme Court victory meant
the fight against segregation in public schools was on a solid foundation.'3 3
One of the strangest stories of the Civil Rights cases involves the
ultimate disposition of the Gaines litigation. After the case was
remanded to the trial court, the university scheduled a deposition of
Gaines. After repeated efforts to contact him, it became apparent that
he had disappeared. He was last seen leaving an Alpha Phi Alpha
fraternity house in Chicago but was never seen again. Various theories
exist as to what happened to Gaines, but all that is actually known is
that he was never heard from again.
D. Thurgood Marshall Succeeds Houston at the NAACP
By the middle of 1936, Houston found himself almost overwhelmed
with his duties at the NAACP. He was serving not only as director of
the NAACP's litigation campaign but also as general counsel, fundraiser, public speaker, and legal advisor to Walter White. At the same
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time, Marshall's work in Baltimore, which was tantamount to volunteer
work, was causing the financial aspects of his practice to suffer. In one
of his frequent letters to Houston, Marshall wrote in desperation that
"something must be done about money.""s
Houston replied that
Marshall should consider joining the staff of the NAACP on a full-time
basis. Marshall eagerly accepted Houston's proposal. Houston then
approached Walter White, who concurred in Houston's suggestion. In
mid-October 1936 Marshall moved to New York to serve as Houston's
assistant."5
Approximately one year later Houston moved back to Washington,
where he rejoined his father's law firm but continued to serve as special
counsel to the NAACP. The reasons for Houston's departure are not
entirely clear, but the move was probably prompted by a mixture of
personal and professional reasons. Houston suffered occasional bouts
with tuberculosis, which he had contracted during World War I. He was
suffering from extreme exhaustion when he returned to Washington.
Other changes occurred in Houston's personal life. He divorced and
remarried during the time he lived in New York, separating from his
first wife when he moved to New York in 1935.13
In a letter to his
father written in 1938, Houston expressed his feelings about the move.
"I have had the feeling all along that I am much more of an outside man
than an inside man .... I usually break down under too much routine."
Houston continued, "Certainly, for the present, I will grow much faster
and be much more of service if I keep free to hit and fight wherever the
" 137
circumstances call for action.
After Houston moved to Washington, there was a major internal
reorganization within the NAACP. In 1924, the Internal Revenue
Service denied tax exempt status for contributions to the NAACP based
on the organization's lobbying activities. The initial decision was
affirmed in 1934 and reaffirmed in 1938. In 1939, at Marshall's
suggestion, the NAACP's Board passed a resolution to establish a
separate, tax-exempt legal entity to carry out its litigation and educational activities. As a result, the NAACP's Legal Defense and Education
Fund ("LDF") was organized in September 1939. After his departure,
Houston retained a close alliance with the NAACP. He returned to the
Legal Advisory Committee, continued to handle NAACP cases, and
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served as advisor to Marshall. Despite Marshall's ascendancy, the
relationship continued with Houston as a senior advisor to Marshall.'38
During the early to mid-1940s, the NAACP filed numerous actions
against local school districts in teacher salary cases, but the pace of the
university cases declined. America was preoccupied with World War II.
The NAACP turned much of its attention to discrimination in the
military. At the same time, the NAACP responded to requests for
assistance in cases raising other issues. Several of these reached the
Supreme Court, and the NAACP obtained a number of significant
victories during this period. In Chambers v. Florida,"9 four black
defendants who were accused of murdering a white fish merchant
pleaded guilty after being detained for five days without access to
counsel. 140 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions after finding
that confessions extracted under brutal conditions such as those used by
the Florida police were
not voluntary and violated defendants' rights to
41
Due Process of law.

In 1941, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided an
important transportation case, Mitchell v. United States,42 in which
a black Illinois congressman challenged an order moving him from his
first-class accommodations while travelling in a train to a smoker
without running water or toilets after the train that started out from
Illinois entered the state of Arkansas.4 4 The Court found that the
facilities provided
for black passengers were not equal to those provided
44
for whites.
In 1943 Charles Houston filed an employment case on behalf of B.W.
Steele, a black railroad fireman. This class action alleged that the
railroad and the union had conspired to eliminate jobs held by black
railroad workers. The case was filed in Alabama. After the Alabama
courts ruled against Houston, the case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 45 In a unanimous opinion, the Court found in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad14 that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation and that the Railway Labor Act
imposed a duty to protect equally the interests of black and white union
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members.'4 7 In the field of labor law, this was the seminal decision
concerning a union's duty of fair representation.
In 1944 the NAACP prevailed in an important voting rights case,
Smith v. Allwright. 45 In an earlier case, Nixon v. Herndon,49 the
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that disenfranchised black
voters.' 50 Texas responded by establishing an "all white" primary.
Because Texas, like the other Southern states, was a one-party state,
primary elections determined who would serve in a given office. In a
case challenging the white primary, Grovey v. Townsend,15 1 the
Supreme Court considered whether the actions of the Texas Democratic
Party were state actions for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2
Grovey's lawyers, Carter Wesley, J. Alston Atkins, and James Nabrit,
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment applied because state law
regulated the operation of the primaries.5 3 The Supreme Court
disagreed and found instead that the primary elections were operated by
the Democratic Party rather than a state agency."'s In the Court's
view, Grovey's argument "confuse[d] the privilege of membership in a
party with the right to vote for one who is to hold public office."' 55
Grovey allowed Texas to continue the practice of disenfranchising
black voters. In a later case, United States v. Classic,5 ' the Justice
Department charged Louisiana election officials with corrupt practices. ' 7 Despite the precedent in Grovey, the Supreme Court found in
Classic that because the United States Constitution required that the
time, place, and manner of elections were to be prescribed by state
legislatures, Congress had the authority to regulate primary as well as
general elections. 55 Using the Classic precedent, Marshall brought a
case on behalf of a black Texan, Louis E. Smith, against an election
judge, S.W. Allwright. In 1944 the Supreme Court voted eight to one to
outlaw the Texas white primary."' The Court found in Smith v.
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Allwright, that the State's actions, although performed by a political
160
party, were not "private" but racially discriminatory state actions.
6
Grovey was overruled. '
In 1946 Marshall and William Hastie were back before the Supreme
Court to argue Morgan v. Virginia,62 another transportation case.
Morgan boarded a Greyhound bus in Gloucester County, Virginia. A
state law required black passengers to sit at the rear of buses. When
she was ordered to the rear of the bus, Morgan declined on the ground
that she was a passenger on a bus engaged in interstate commerce.'6 3
The Supreme Court held that because she was an interstate passenger,
Morgan could not be subjected to local and state ordinances requiring
segregation in public transportation.1r
E.

The Final Graduate School Cases
After World War II, the NAACP directed its energies toward revitalizing the graduate school litigation program. Spurred by the thousands
of returning veterans with government benefits that could be used to
finance their educations, the NAACP recognized that there was an
increased demand for higher education. With Marshall at the helm, the
LDF renewed its campaign to break through the barriers that prevented
black students from attending state-supported institutions. In some
ways the LDF picked up where it had left off with Murray and Gaines,
but in the post-war cases, several innovative approaches were introduced. One involved a move from state courts to federal courts. This
expedited the cases by eliminating several steps in the appeals process.
Instead of appealing from a trial court to an intermediate appellate or
a state supreme court, the lawyers took advantage of a procedure created
by the Judiciary Act of 1937 that allowed constitutional challenges to
state statutes to be heard by special three-judge panels in district courts.
Judgments entered by these tribunals could be reviewed directly by the
Supreme Court instead of proceeding through the usual appellate
process. This process reduced the time and expense associated with
protracted court battles and allowed the LDF to move cases much faster
than in previous years.
Another development involved the strategic use of expert testimony.
Marshall began to employ the testimony of educational and other experts
to demonstrate the psychological harm that enforced segregation
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inflicted on black students. Focusing carefully on the intricacies of the
educational process, Marshall also used experts to prove that several
intangible features of the educational experience could not be duplicated
in a segregated setting even if the physical facilities were equalized.
Because most of the trials involved efforts to gain admission to law
schools, the judges presiding over the cases were able to grasp, from
personal experience, the technical concepts that the experts described.
Because the judges were law school graduates, it was not difficult for
them to understand why intangible features like the interaction of
students were such an integral part of the educational process. This
made it clear that the Plessy doctrine was not only predicated on a
flawed assumption, but the equality anticipated by the Fourteenth
Amendment could not be realized even if the states were able to
establish separate systems that duplicated exactly the facilities reserved
for white students.
The final graduate school cases represented a transition from the
holdings in the early equalization cases to the final decisions involving
primary and secondary schools. The post-war cases went beyond a
demand for physical equality to a showing that equal facilities could not
remedy all of the deprivations caused by racial segregation. Once the
courts were forced to grapple with this evidence, it would not be long
before they were forced to concede that there was no such thing as
separate equality.
1. Sipuel v. Oklahoma. The first of the post-war cases was filed
against the University of Oklahoma in April 1946. Roscoe Dundee, an
attorney and publisher of a black newspaper, was one of the leaders of
the Oklahoma chapter of the NAACP. Like Missouri and Maryland,
Oklahoma established separate schools for black students but made no
provisions for graduate school training. After months of publicizing the
inequities of the Oklahoma system, Dundee identified several potential
plaintiffs. From a field of several possibilities the NAACP settled on
Ada Louise Sipuel.
Sipuel was an honor student at the State College for Negroes in
Langston, Oklahoma." 5 She applied for admission to the University
of Oklahoma's Law School but was denied on the grounds that the school
did not admit black students. The lawsuit was filed in an Oklahoma trial
court. In July, the trial court dismissed Sipuel's case. On appeal the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Sipuel's failure to demand a law
school for black students precluded her from seeking admission to the
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school established for whites. The court found Oklahoma was not
obligated to establish a black law school until demand justified the
expenditure of funds. Since Sipuel had not made the necessary demand,
the State could not have anticipated the need for creating a separate law
school."
Based on this reasoning, the court found that Sipuel had
"wholly failed to establish any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
67
of the Federal Constitution."1

The NAACP sought review of the Oklahoma court's decision in the
United States Supreme Court. At the time the petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed, Marshall was reluctant to proceed because the facts
of the case had been stipulated. This meant that the evidentiary record
was not as fully developed as he would have preferred. Despite
Marshall's reservations, the appeal was pursued and the case was
argued in the Supreme Court during the first week of 1948. In a
surprise move, the Court issued168a decision four days later that reversed
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

In a brief, per curiam opinion, the Court noted first that Sipuel's
"application for admission was denied, solely because of her color." 69
The Court then found:
The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state
institution. To this time, it has been denied her although during the
same period many white applicants have been afforded legal education
by the State. The State must provide it for her in conformity with the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and provide it
7
as soon as it does for applicants of any other group.
On January 17, 1948, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the Board
of Regents to allow Sipuel to attend law school as soon as it accorded
that opportunity to any other student.' 7' On the basis of that decision,
the Oklahoma trial court issued an order that enjoined the state from
enrolling any students at the university's law school until a separate
school for black students was established and ready to function.'72
Unwilling to retreat from its policy of racial segregation, the Board of
Regents responded by roping off an area in the State Capitol, designating it as the "Negro law school," and hiring three black lawyers to serve
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as faculty. Marshall was so outraged that he took the extraordinary
step of returning to the United States Supreme Court with a request
that it find that the State of Oklahoma had not complied with the
Court's decision.'73 To Marshall's surprise and disappointment, the
Supreme Court ruled in Oklahoma's favor.'74
Despite this setback, Walter White, the NAACP's Executive Secretary,
was heartened by the response the case received outside the courtroom.
When Sipuel originally applied in person on the University of Oklahoma's campus, she was cordially received by a number of white
students who treated her to lunch after the ordeal of the admission
refusal was over. The university's actions created an uproar on the
Oklahoma campus. Students held a large demonstration in front of the
administration building to protest the university's segregation policies.
Another demonstration was held when Oklahoma established a separate
law school in the State Capitol. During the latter demonstration,
speaker after speaker insisted that the university allow the admission
of black students. In a dramatic conclusion to the rally, a copy of the
Fourteenth Amendment was burned, and the ashes were mailed to the
White House in symbolic protest against the state's nullification of
Sipuel's Constitutional rights.'75
2. Sweatt v. Painter. At the same time that the NAACP was
battling against Oklahoma, an identical suit was filed on behalf of a
student in Texas. Hemon Marion Sweatt, a letter carrier employed by
the United States Post Office, applied for admission to the University of
Texas Law School in 1946.176 Sweatt's application was denied on the
grounds of his race even though Texas had not established a separate
law school for black students. 77 On May 14, 1946, suit was filed in
Texas state court. In June, the trial court held a hearing and issued an
order giving the State
six months to establish a law school for African78
American students.

The State responded by renting a few rooms in Houston and hiring
two black lawyers to serve as faculty for what it designated as the newly
established branch of Prairie View University, a school previously
established for black students. At a status conference in December 1946,
173. Id. at 150.
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the trial court found that the179facilities at Houston were "substantially
equal" to the Austin campus.
Marshall appealed the trial court's ruling.8s While the appeal was
pending, Texas took steps to bolster the trial court's finding of substantial equality. The location of the "Negro" Law School was transferred to
Austin, pending the construction of a permanent facility in Houston.
Three rooms in a building across the street from the State Capitol were
set aside to house the temporary law school. The students were given
access to the law library located at the State Capitol. Professors from
the University of Texas were assigned to provide instruction.18 ' The
Texas legislature subsequently appropriated three million dollars to
upgrade the facilities at Prairie View and designated one hundred
thousand dollars for the creation of a law school. Because of the change
in circumstances, the case was remanded to the trial court for a full
evidentiary hearing."i 2
Faced with a weakened case on the issue of physical inequality,
Marshall, who was assisted by James Nabrit and a Dallas attorney, W.
J. Durham, chose a different tack. His new approach became critical to
the Supreme Court's decision in the final series of graduate school cases
and would provide the foundation for the decision in Brown.'
Marshall presented the testimony of an array of expert witnesses who
testified that segregation had no scientific basis in public schools."
Other experts testified about the relative learning abilities of black
students and white students. The dean of the law school at the
University of Pennsylvania testified about the importance of interaction
among students in the learning process. A professor, he explained,
however well qualified, could not provide the elements of the educational
experience that are derived from interaction among students. Another
witness, Robert Redenfield, who held doctorates in anthropology and
law, testified that there was no scientific basis for the general assumption concerning the inherent intellectual inferiority of black students. 8 5
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The university's attorneys attempted to undermine the experts'
testimony. They attacked Sweatt's motives for filing the lawsuit and
attempted to prove that the case was actually initiated by the NAACP.
They also contended that Sweatt's refusal to enroll in the black law
school demonstrated his bad faith. Approximately one month after the
trial ended, the trial court entered a judgment for defendants. The case
was appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. 186 On February 25,
187
1948, that court issued a decision affirming the trial court's ruling.
The NAACP was unable to persuade the judges in the Texas courts,
but it had better luck with the students at the University of Texas.
After Sweatt was filed, mass meetings were staged by students during
the trial. The president of the student council and several members of
the faculty spoke in support of Sweatt. As Walter White reported later,
"[a] college chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People was organized on the campus of the University-the only
all-white unit of the NAACP."' 88 To White, at least, this demonstrated
that the litigation program was having a tangible effect on public
opinion. It was, at minimum, a sign that the NAACP's position was
gaining support among whites.
The last of the major graduate school cases involved a sixty-eight-yearold black professor at Langston University, George W. McLaurin, who
applied in 1948 to the graduate school of education at the University of
Oklahoma. After his application was denied, the NAACP filed a suit on
his behalf.'89 This time Marshall pursued an approach that the
NAACP and other public interest lawyers would follow in later years.
Charles Houston preferred to file suits in state courts based on his
multi-purpose strategy of winning cases for individual plaintiffs, creating
precedents that could be applied later, and generating broad-based
support for the NAACP's mission within African-American communities.
Marshall decided to alter this approach. McLaurin was heard by a
three-judge panel in the federal district court." After the trial court
entered a judgement for the university, a petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court.' 9 '
3. The Supreme Court's Decisions in Sweatt and McLaurin. Sweatt and McLaurin reached the Supreme Court at the same
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time. McLaurin was argued on April 3 and 4, 1950, and Sweatt was
presented on April 4, 1950. The decisions in both cases were issued on
June 5, 1950.192 The Court declined to consider whether "Plessy v.
Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge
respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects
of racial segregation."'93 Nevertheless, in the two opinions, the Court
came close to acknowledging the inequities inherent in state-sponsored
segregation.
In Sweatt the Court found that the facilities available at the newly
established law school were not equal in quantity or quality to those
available at the law school in Austin. 94 "In terms of number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the
student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar
activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior."'95 The
Court did not limit its analysis to a comparison of physical resources.
It went on to conclude that the quality of educational instruction was
inevitably diminished by isolation. 196 The Court found that:
[Tihe University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name a few,
include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community,
traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a
free choice between these law schools would consider the question
close.'

97

The Court reached a similar conclusion in McLaurin.9 s McLaurin
was different from Sweatt because the State allowed McLaurin access to
the same instruction as whites, except on a racially segregated basis.
Thus, in McLaurin, the Court considered whether segregation within a
university violated the Fourteenth Amendment.'99 As the opinion
explained, McLaurin
was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine
floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading
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room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time
from the other students in the school cafeteria. °0
While the case was pending, some modifications were made in the
arrangements to accommodate McLaurin:
For some time, the section of the classroom in which [McLaurin] sat
was surrounded by a rail on which there was a sign stating, "Reserved
For Colored," but these have been removed. He is now assigned to a
seat in the classroom in a row specified for colored students; he is
assigned to a table in the library on the main floor; and he is permitted
to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as other students, although
here again he is assigned to a special table. 01
These actions, the Court found, "handicapped [McLaurin] in his pursuit
of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit
his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students and, in general, to learn his profession. 2 2
With these decisions, the stage was finally set for a direct challenge
to Plessy. In Sipuel, Sweatt, and McLaurin, the Court did not directly
address the constitutionality of state-enforced segregation. Viewed
together, however, it is clear from the analysis of these decisions that
the Plessy doctrine had been completely undermined. As the Court
recognized in earlier cases, the states failed to provide educational
facilities for black students that were equivalent to those established for
white students. This legal recognition meant that the states could not
continue to allocate generous resources to white schools while they
maintained inadequate and poorly financed facilities for black students.
This effect, of course, was the import of the earlier graduate school cases,
but the final decisions went much further. Responding to the NAACP's
expert testimony, the Court recognized in Sweatt that there was more
to education than bricks and mortar. Much of the process involved
interaction among students and the exchange of diverse ideas through
discussions. Exchanges of this sort could not occur in a system in which
African-American students were cut off from contact with other students.
The final, and in some ways, most compelling case was made by the
State of Oklahoma's actions in McLaurin. Because McLaurin was
allowed to sit in a classroom and receive the same instruction as white
students, the isolation rationale of Sweatt did not apply. Yet, by roping
McLaurin off in a "colored only" section in the classroom and setting
aside separate tables in the library and cafeteria, the state graphically
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demonstrated the stigmatizing effects of segregation far better than any
expert testimony ever could. While the case was pending, a photograph
of Professor McLaurin appeared in newspapers and magazines across the
country. The picture shows a classroom at the University of Oklahoma.
Sitting in a corner of the classroom behind a rope with a small sign
attached, McLaurin is leaning forward, peering into the classroom
apparently straining to hear the discussion. Proving the axiom that "one
picture is worth a thousand words," the photograph shows just how
demeaning segregation was in actual practice.
By the time the NAACP proceeded with the primary school cases, the
defenses raised by segregation's supporters had been considerably
undermined. The separate facilities were not equal, and there was never
any pretense of equivalence in any place where segregated education
was practiced.
The separate equality on which segregation was
premised had never been a reality. The expert testimony in McLaurin
and Sweatt focused the courts' attention on the devastating psychological
effects of segregation and on the impact these practices had on the
learning process. Once the courts were compelled to confront the
stigmatizing effects of segregation and the message of inferiority the
system was designed to convey, it would be impossible to reconcile
segregated education with the equality principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1950 the NAACP held another conference of the lawyers and
consultants who were working on desegregation cases. During that
meeting, the conferees adopted a formal resolution that in all future
cases the relief sought would be "aimed at obtaining an education on a
non-segregated basis."20 3 This resolution meant that the "equalization"
strategy had finally given way to a direct challenge to segregation. The
graduate school cases shattered the foundation on which formal
segregation was premised and compelled the courts to concede the
inequities that prevailed under the separate but equal doctrine. After
Sipuel, Sweatt, and McLaurin, it was clear that the time had come to
challenge directly the policy of racial subordination that the system of
segregation was designed to perpetuate. This challenge was accomplished four years later in Brown when the Supreme
Court held that
20 4
segregation in public schools was unconstitutional.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Charles Houston did not live to see the culmination of his efforts. He
died in 1950 when the final school desegregation cases were pending in
the lower courts. Houston represented plaintiffs in Bolling v. Sharpe, 2 05 a District of Columbia case during the early stages of the case.
Had he lived, Houston would have been among the lawyers who argued
the five school desegregation cases that are now remembered as Brown
2 °6 Shortly before his death, however, Houston
v. Board of Education.
recorded what turned out to be his last comments on the struggle by
African-Americans to obtain equality:
There've been times when it is possible to forecast the results of a
contest of a battle, of a lawsuit long before the final event has taken
place. And so far as our struggle for civil rights is concerned, I'm not
worried about that now. The struggle for civil rights in America is won
What I am more concerned about is the fact that the Negro shall not
be content with simply demanding a share in the existing system. It
seems to me that his fundamental responsibility [is] to make sure that
the system which shall survive in the United States of America ...
shall207be a system which guarantees justice and freedom for every-

one.

The decision in Brown launched an era of Civil Rights activism on an
unprecedented scale. In the 1950s and 1960s, African-Americans united
in a broad-based effort to demand a full measure of Constitutional
freedoms. Boycotts, sit-ins, and other forms of nonviolent protest spread
across the South. As Houston predicted in the 1930s, the NAACP's
litigation campaign encouraged local communities to demand and to
fight for their rights. In the 1960s, black Americans insisted that the
system of segregation be dismantled in its entirety. Lawsuits challenging discrimination filled the dockets of courthouses across the United
States. After a decade of intense struggle, often in the face of violent
resistance, a series of Congressional enactments in the 1960s ended de
jure segregation. These enactments included the various Titles of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2o8 which prohibited discrimination in education, employment, and public accommodations; the Civil Rights Act of
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207. Audio recording by Charles Houston at the home of Dr. Edward Mazique in
Washington, D.C. during the Christmas holidays (1949) (copy of tape on file with Author).
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1965,209 which re-enfranchised African-American voters in the South;
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968,210 which outlawed discrimination in
housing. These events were the direct product of the foundation laid by
the equalization cases.
In the past few years, the optimism generated by the Civil Rights
advances of the 1950s and 1960s has given way to setbacks and
disappointment. Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has all but
halted the advances of the post-Brown era. Ironically the majority of
African-American children in urban areas still attend segregated and
unequal schools. Their parents are relegated to the lowest paying and
least desirable jobs. In urban areas, most African-Americans live in
what one study described as a state of "multi-dimensional hyper
segregation." After years of progress, race relations are now in a state
of marked decline. In the case of public schools, the South reacted to
Brown with a policy of massive resistance. The "deliberate speed"
language of the remedy in Brown II was used to delay compliance except
for a few token efforts. Almost fifteen years after Brown, the Supreme
Court finally abandoned its gradualist approach and ordered school
districts to take immediate steps to dismantle their segregated systems.
By then, changes in the demographic patterns made this undertaking a
far more complicated task. During the years following World War II,
white families relocated to suburban areas while the African-American
population remained concentrated in the cities. Racial segregation,
formerly required by law, persisted through custom and practice.
Residential segregation is so pervasive now that blacks and whites are
further apart in 2001 than they were in 1954. In Missouri v. Jenkins,21' the Supreme Court established a new standard for determining
"unitary status."212 Prior to Jenkins, school authorities had an affirmative duty to eliminate all vestiges of segregation "root and
branch."2 13 Under Jenkins they are only required to eliminate
segregation to the "extent practicable. 214 Because almost all school
districts will be able to satisfy this relaxed standard, Jenkins signals the
end of court-supervised desegregation efforts.
The federal courts that were once receptive to the claims of Civil
Rights advocates have grown hostile or indifferent. Invoking the mantra
of "color-blindness," the courts are undermining gains made in previous
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years. It is clear, however, that the promise of Brown has not been
fulfilled. A color-blind standard will treat blacks and whites as if they
were similarly-situated, but this standard ignores the history of
segregation in America and the pervasive vestiges of that system.
African-Americans and other people of color do not enjoy the same
privileges as whites. Racial barriers have been lowered, but they still
exist. A color-blind approach to Equal Protection jurisprudence will
operate to prolong the existing racial hierarchy. The question that
Charles Houston posed nearly fifty years ago remains: whether "the
system which shall survive in the United States of America ....
Shall
be a system which guarantees justice and freedom for everyone."2 5

215. Audio recording by Charles Houston at the home of Dr. Edward Mazique in
Washington, D.C. during the Christmas holidays (1949) (copy of tape on file with Author).
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